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Hartnick: Fair Use

THE DEFENSE OF "FAIR USE": A PREh{ER
Alan J. Hartnick*
The law in our society should act as a barrier or marker to direct
appropriate discourse and behavior. Yet, when the law is so
unclear or interpreted so diversely, the existence of such a law may
be weakened in its effect. Such is the case with the current state of
the decisional law as related to the defense of fair use and its
application in the area of copyright infringement.'
When one holds a copyright, it is some degree of assurance that
the copyrighted work will not be utilized without one's express
permission. However, the fair use doctrine allows for a certain
degree of unauthorized use without the consent of the copyright
holder and thus limits the exclusivity granted by the copyright.
What defines "fair use" is unclear at best and appears to be
defined by the particular judge in a particular case. Such ad hoc
application has seemingly frustrated the true intent of the doctrine
and has resulted in much uncertainty in this area of the law.' The
federal copyright statute has been seen as an attempt to provide
courts with useful standards by which to decide these cases by
setting forth exemplary purposes where fair use may be applied,
and by describing certain factors for assessing whether a use is
indeed "fair."s
Judicial interpretation of these purposes and factors has been
unpredictable. Because the statutory language is illustrative and not
exclusive, the application of "fair use" has made for tumultuous
6
terrain.
* The author is a member of the New York City firm of Abelman, Frayne
and Schwab, an adjunct professor at New York University Law School, and a
columnist on media and entertainment law for the New York Lav Journal.

' See generally Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986); but see
American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
2

See infra note 9 and accompanying text.

32

P.

4 H.R.

GOLDSTEIN,

COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (1989).

REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
[hereinafter H.R. REP.].
ISee infra note 9 and accompanying text.
6See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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This article is presented as a primer on the defense of "fair use"
in copyright infringement cases. It discusses in great detail the
statutory background of the defense, setting forth the dual
guidelines for application of the fair use doctrine. Finally, this
article will also discuss the new law with respect to Internet treaties
signed in Geneva in December of 1996. Congress has decided that
the rights of the copyright owner in cyberspace are limited by this
defense.7
Before one can opine as to the possibility that "fair use" does or
does not apply, one needs some grounding in the law as it has
developed.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Under the current copyright statute, Title 17 of the United States
Code, copyright, which is an intangible property interest, exists as
a matter of law from the moment that a work is "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression."8 This property right is held by the
author or creator of a work or, in the case of works made for hire,
by the employer who contracts for creation of the work.9 The
infra notes 135-145 and accompanying text.
8 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995).
Section 102 provides in pertinent part:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
7See

of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
9 17 U.S.C § 107 (1995). Section 107 provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the

fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including

multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether

the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and

character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion of the use in relation to the

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/7
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holder of the copyright interest in a work is entitled to exclusive
use, including the right of reproduction of the work for the duration
of the copyright and may license its use and reproduction by
0
others.'

Intellectual property

issues arise whenever materials are

reproduced without the consent of the copyright holder."

copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors."
Id.

'0 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995). Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe owner of copyright under this title had the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1)to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies and phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.
Id.

"17 U.S.C. § 501 (1995). Section 501 provides in pertinent part:
Infringement of copyright (a) Anyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided by
section 106(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into
the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer
of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be..
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FAIR USE
Under certain circumstances, works under copyright, or portions
thereof, may be used without the permission of the copyright
holder.' 2 Such use is termed "fair use" and is addressed by the
current copyright statute at Section 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976.13 It is a judge made rule whose theoretical basis is the
implied consent of the copyright owner so as to permit a critic to
quote literally.
Fair use is "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without [the
owner's] consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner by the copyright."' Fair use operates to limit the exclusive
rights of copyright holders, which are granted by the statute."5
"Fair use," however, is a term without a clear definition. The
House of Representatives Report, which accompanied the
Copyright Act of 1976, observed that the fair use doctrine is "an
equitable rule of reason," or a judge-made category, and, as such,
is not susceptible of any "generally applicable definition." 6 The
result is that all determinations are ad hoc."' There really are no
rules of thumb. All evaluations are fact specific.
The fair use doctrine became an explicit part of the United States
copyright statute upon adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act. 8 The
House Report observes that the "claim that a defendant's acts
constituted a fair use rather than an infringement has been raised as
a defense in innumerably (sic) copyright actions over the years, and

12

17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (1995).

"3See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
(citing H.

LAW AND PRACTICE

187 (1989)
260

BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY

(1944)); see also Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
'5See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16 See H.R. REP., supra note 4,at 65.
'7Id. at 66 (reasoning that beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis).
8 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine

and applying it."' 9
Hitchcock's Rear Window was deemed to have infringed on a
copyrighted story.20 The Supreme Court found the infringement to
be a "classic example of an unfair use: a commercial use of a

fictional story that adversely affects the story owner's adaptation
rights."2' Of course, motion pictures and literature are not the only
areas2 where a fair use defense is asserted. The Supreme Court
found in favor of the fair use defense in the parodic version of Roy
Orbison's Pretty Woman.? The Court analyzed all four factors set
forth in section 1OT-4 of the Copyright Act and found that all
supported the fair use defense.s Two appellate courts conducted
the same analysis, both finding against the fair use defense. Other
examples: the Second Circuit found the publication of excerpts
from the Seinfeld television show to be an infringement of the
The Ninth
copyright owned by Castle Rock Entertainment.Circuit found the copying and selling of the copyrighted broadcast
of the Reginald Denny beating to be an infringement.2 It is not
'9 H.R.

REP., at 65.

20

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
2'1See
d. at 238.
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Section 102(a) provides in pertinent part: "Works of
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." Id.
' See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). See also,
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding the parody of the song
When Sonny Gets Blue to be fair use).
24 See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
25 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
26 Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying fair use defense for a published trivia book with
quotes and references to the television show Seinfeld); Los Angeles News
Service v. Reuters Television International, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding infringement of a newsbroadcast of the beating of Reginald Denny
during the riots in Los Angeles which was copied and later re-broadcast).
27 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 146.
2'Los Angeles News Service, 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998).
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necessary that all four factors weigh in favor of one party for
victory. The court conducts the analysis and makes a conclusion
based on an aggregate assessment of the factors .29
Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, the
application of the doctrine and of Section 107 must be made on a
case-by-case basis.3 0 This case-by-case review tends to result in an
unpredictable application depending on the facts of each case. The
flexibility of the fair use defense means that there are no bright
lines.
SOME EXAMPLES
To continue with examples, before we begin our primer:
In Fisher v. Dees,3' the Ninth Circuit held that a parody of
Marvin Fisher's "When Sonny Gets Blue" was considered fair
use.32 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit allowed a fair use defense in
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications3 where an author used
practically exact quotations from Otto Eisenschiml's works.'
Parody is a type of permitted use considered fair. 5 Rick Dees, a
disc jockey, created a parody of Marvin Fisher's When Sonny Gets
Blue.36 Dees' work was entitled When Sonny Sniffs Glue and was
included with a host of other parodied works in an album entitled
Put It Where the Moon Don't Shine.37 Dees requested permission
from Fisher prior to publishing the parody, but was denied.3" The
Ninth Circuit noted that a denied request does not necessarily result

29
30

Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 146.
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,

560 (1985). See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986);
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957).
3"
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
32
Id.at 440.
"3246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957).
34Id. at 601.
31See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435.
36 Id. at 434.
37id.
38

Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/7
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in a copyright infringement when the author publishes anyway.3 9
Additionally, the court recognized that requests to parody one's
work would likely be denied.4° As such, considering Dees'
publication a copyright infringement merely because his request
was rebuffed would undermine the parody example of "fair use."'"
In this case, Dees copied approximately sixteen percent of
Fisher's music, 42 specifically to conjure up the original for the
purpose of the parody. 43
The specific work at issue is
approximately 1/80' of the total on the album." Because the Code
specifies the "amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole""5 as one of the factors
in determining fair use, it is necessary for the court to analyze both
the purpose and amount of the use. ' 6 Previous cases identified a
"conjure up" test 7 whereby any amount greater than what is
necessary to "conjure up" the original is considered an
infringement.11 The Fisher court specifically rejected this view as
too rigid, noting: "The concept of 'conjuring up' an original came
into the copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an
original may be used, but as a recognition that a parody frequently
needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original in order to
49
make its humorous point."
Recognizing this baseline, the court continued to identify three
considerations in determining whether the use of copyrighted

" Id. at 437. The court specifically found that penalizing Dees for publishing
despite failure to obtain permission from Fisher would "penalize him for a
modest show of consideration... [and the court] refuse[d] to discourage [such

requests]." Id.
40 id.
41Id.
42

1d. at 434.

43

d. at 438.
" Id. at 434.
45See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
46Fisher,794 F.2d at 439.
4 Walt Disney Productions
v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
4
1 Fisher,794 F.2d at 438.
4
9 Id.at 438-39. (quoting Elsmere Music, Inc., v. National Broadcasting Co.,
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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material is to be considered excessive: 0 "(1) the degree of public
recognition of the original work, (2) the ease of conjuring up the
original work in the chosen medium, and (3) the focus of the
parody." 5 ' In utilizing these factors, the court concluded that Dees'
use of Fisher's work is entitled to a "fair use" defense. 2
Similarly, but in a different context, the Eisenschiml court
concluded that Joseph John Millard's use of excerpts from Otto
Eisenschiml's work was a fair use." Otto Eisenschiml was a noted
authority on Civil War history who specifically focused on the
Lincoln assassination.54 Because of the limited nature of his
specialty, a researcher doing a piece on this subject would likely
come across his work.5
In analyzing whether the challenged work was an infringement,
the court compared sections of the challenged work with sections of
the Eisenschiml work.56 Millard's own testimony revealed that
there was a similarity to their work. 57 The court noted that Millard
used material from Eisenschinl's research; however, the test is not
whether the research was independent, but "whether the one
charged with the infringement has made an independent production,
or made a substantial and unfair use of the complainant's work. "5
Using this test, the court found that the use of Eisenschiml's work
was fair.59

50 Id.
at

439.

5'See also Air Pirates,581
52 Fisher,794 F.2d at 440.

F.2d at 757-58.
The Court stated "[w]e conclude that When Sonny

Sniffs Glue is a parody deserving of fair-use protection as a matter of law."
Id.
"
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1957).
54
/d. at 600.
55Id. at 604.
56
ld. at 601.
17 Id. at 602.
" Id. at 603. (quoting Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236, 237 (2d

Cir. 1929)).
59 Id.

at 604.
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THE PRIMER
In 1985, Justice O'Connor, considering "fair use" in the
circumstances of the nonpermissive publication by The Nation of
excerpts from former President Ford's memoirs, wrote that
"copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of
knowledge," but that the "rights conferred by copyright are
designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair
return for their labors."w
Justice O'Connor's statement reflects the bedrock of the fair use
doctrine which is that the fair use exception to the copyright
monopoly is designed for the greater good and not for individual
profit.6' For this reason, fair use protection is not liberally
accorded unlicensed use of copyrighted materials by profit-making
ventures. TWO GUIDES
Section 107 bears out the above-stated principle that there is no
strict definition of "fair use." The statute steers clear of providing
any definition whatsoever. Instead, Section 107 offers two rough
guides for application of the fair use doctrine, and the guides are
interrelated.63 The first guide is a list of six exemplary purposes for
which copyrighted material may be used without benefit of a
license.4 The second is a set of four non-exclusive factors to be
o Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 545-46
(1985).
61 Id. See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975).
62 Compare Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that the commercial use of Seinfeld television program material not
entitled to fair use defense), and Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters, 149
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding rebroadcast of Reginald Denny beating not
entitled to fair use defense), and Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)
(holding movie production of Hitchcock's Rear Window not entitled to fair use
defense), with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that
parodic version of song was entitled to fair use defense).
3See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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considered in each case of unlicensed use, but without limitation,
6
and including the six exemplary purposes.
(A)

Exemplary Purposes

The first sentence of Section 107 identifies six specific purposes,
which may bring unlicensed use, including reproduction, of
copyrighted material under the rubric of "fair use.''6 Those six
purposes are "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
scholarship, or research." 67
This list is suggestive and not
exclusive.
The list of exemplary permissible purposes is amplified somewhat
by the House Report, which gives clearance to:
quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of
illustration or comment, quotation of short passages in
scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of
the author's observations; use in a parody of some of the
content of the work parodied; summary of an address or
article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction
by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a
damaged copy; reproduction by a teacher or student of a
small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a
work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports;
incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or
broadcast, of a work located in the scene of an event being
reported .68
Most of the uses described in the House Report relate to
noncommercial activity, and particularly to education, scholarship
and the maintenance of archives.6 9 The examples relating to
newspapers and broadcasting are certainly related to commercial

' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
68
69

H.R.REP., at 65.
1d.
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activity, especially the commercial activity of large corporations;
but the commercial activity of journalism has, for the most part,
been distinguished (though sometimes with difficulty) from the
entertainment industry and has been rationalized, whether or not
with justification, as a peculiarly high-minded enterprise.
Essentially, there is a difference between editorial and advertising
use. Editorial use has more fair use leeway.
(B) The Four Factors
The second sentence of Section 107 provides four factors to be
weighed by courts in determining whether particular uses are
"fair. " 0 These four factors, like the categories in the first sentence
of the section, are non-exclusive and courts are free to take other
factors into consideration.
The four "factors to be considered" are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work"
(1) Purpose of the Use
The first factor (i.e., purpose) sets up the explicit contrast
between "commercial purpose" and nonprofit educational
purpose?
Much has been made of the commercial-noncommercial
distinction. Clearly educational purposes are favored; and, it used
to be thought that commercial purposes are presumptively not
70See

supra note 9 and accompanying text.
9 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note
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permissible in a fair use analysis.Y It is nevertheless axiomatic that
the existence of a commercial purpose does not absolutely prevent
an unlicensed use being "fair." 7 4 In a famous pronouncement, the
Ninth Circuit has said that, even "assuming that the use had a
purely commercial purpose, the presumption of unfairness can be
rebutted by the characteristics of its use."7" In Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc. ,76 discussed below, the Court held that there was
no such presumption.'
In fact, public policy may well suggest that the determining factor
in the "fairness" of a use is not the question of a profit motive but
the actual or likely benefit that the use may provide to society. 8
In the context of biographical writing, the Second Circuit has
recognized that a profit-making enterprise may be entitled to broad,
unlicensed use of copyrighted material. In Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc. ," the Court wrote:
Whether an author or publisher reaps economic benefits from
the sale of a biographical work, or whether its publication is
motivated in part by a desire for commercial gain, or whether
it is designed for the popular market, i.e., the average citizen,
rather than the college professor, has no bearing on whether a
Thus,
public benefit may be derived from such a work ....
73

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417

(1984).
4 Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

The Court in Campbell
held that "[t]he language of the statute [17 U.S.C. § 1071 makes clear that the
commercial .

purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor. Id.

at 584.
1 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-53
(9th Cir. 1986). See also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980).
76 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
77Id.
78

at 584.

See generally 2 P.

GOLDSTEIN,

COPYRIGHT:

PRINCIPLES,

LAW &

PRACTICE 187 (1989).
79 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). In
Rosemont, the owner of copyrights on magazine articles concerning a celebrity
brought a copyright infringement action against a publisher which had issued a
biography of the celebrity. Id. at 303.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/7
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we conclude that whether an author or publisher has a
commercial motive or writes in a popular style is irrelevant to
a determination of whether a particular use of copyrighted
material in a work, which offers some benefit to the public,
constitutes fair use.so
Therefore, it is clear that courts do find unlicensed, commercial
use of copyrighted material to be "fair.""'
Justice Souter, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' stated
that lower courts should not consider that every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively unfair, based upon an
erroneous reading of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc." Justice Souter said:
The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial
or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and
character . . . Accordingly, the mere fact that a use is
educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a
finding of infringement, any more than the commercial
character of a use bars a finding of fairness. If, indeed,
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of
fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the
illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of section
107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching,
scholarship, and research, since these activities "are generally
conducted for profit in this country." Congress could not
have intended such a rule, which certainly is not inferable
from the common-law cases, arising as they did from the
world of letters in which Samuel Johnson could pronounce

0 Id.

at 306.

11 Id. at 308.

For example, the Second Circuit has held "[tihe fair use

privilege has been applied without question to other publications which have
obviously been motivated in part by a desire for economic gain." Id.
1_510 U.S. 569 (1994).
83 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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that "[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for
money."4
Furthermore, Justice Souter noted that:
Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption ....
Rather, as we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for
the proposition that the "fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." But that is all,
and the fact that even the force of that tendency will vary
with the context is a further reason against elevating
commerciality to hard presumptive significance.5
Nonetheless, the presence of commercial arrangements and a
likelihood of profits raise an inference that a user should clear the
rights to any copyrighted materials prior to use. The case law, as
well as the statutes, suggests that unlicensed use in a commercial
context will only be deemed "fair use" if it is de minimus or a true
parody. 86
One must be aware that demonstrating that an infringement is de
minimus may not be an easy task. "Whether an infringement is de
minimus is determined by the amount taken without authorization
from infringed work, and not by the characteristics of infringing
work."87 In Woods, Universal used a copyrighted drawing created
by Woods in their movie, "12 Monkeys," without obtaining
Woods' permission."s "Universal argue[d] that the infringement
[was] de minimus because the infringing footage in '12 Monkeys'
amount[ed] to less than five minutes in a movie 130 minutes
4 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S LFE OF JOHNSON 19
(G. Hill ed. 1934)).
85 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562

(1985). "The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit
is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." Id.
86 Sony, 464 U.S. at 481-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87 Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
88
Id. at

63.
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long."u 9 Judge Cedarbaum found that "'12 Monkeys' copie[d]
substantial portions of Woods' drawing"go and granted Woods'

motion for a preliminary injunction. 91
Courts also consider whether the use is transfonmative, that is,
whether the use is not a substitute for the copyrighted work, but

creates something new, with a further purpose or different
character.? The more transformative the new work, the less
important are other factors, like commercialism, that will weigh
against a finding of fair use. 9

As an example, parody, Justice

Souter notes in Acuff Rose, is transformative.9 On the other hand,
transformative uses are not required for a finding of fair use.
(2) Nature of the Copyrighted Material
The distinctions, which courts have found to be germane in
judicial inquiry as to the nature of copyrighted material under
Section 107, have been "factual" works as opposed to "inventive"
works. 95 Works of a factual nature are accorded a lower degree of

protection than imaginative works on the ground that the law favors
the free flow of information and provides maximal safeguards for
products of the imagination.96
89 Id.

at 65.
1 Id. In her analysis Judge Cedarbaum pointed out that "[a] comparison of
'(Upper) Chamber' and footage from 12 MoNKEYs demonstrates that the
movie has copied Woods' drawing in striking detail." Id. at 64.
91 Id. (noting that Universal had failed to demonstrate that this was a case of
"special circumstances" justifying only an award of damages and not an
injunction).
I Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). See also
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105
(1990).
93Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
91 Id. Justice Souter reasoned that "[1like less ostensibly humorous forms of
criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work,
and, in the process, creating a new one." Id.
I Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); New
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221
(D.N.J. 1977).
" Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049. Judge Timbers reasoned that "[s]ince
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Courts had regarded published works as in need of a lower
degree of protection than unpublished worksY The Copyright Law
was amended in 1992 to provide that the fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above fair use factors.98 And
so, there is no per se rule barring claims of fair use of unpublished
works.19 Unpublished works no longer have a special status under
0
Harperv. Row Publishersv. Nation Enterprises."
There is greater license for use of works that are unavailable -works that are out of print or otherwise unobtainable by ordinary
01
means.
There also appears to be a stronger argument for expropriation
under the fair use doctrine of portions of "a work more of diligence

than of originality or inventiveness. "102 In the Southern District of
New York, Judge Carter has stated that "copyright protection for
compilations of factual materials cannot be reconciled with the
general principles of the copyright law" and that "such works
should be most conducive to fair use. 03
But, sometimes factual materials cannot be copied. The Second
Circuit has recognized that "the advent of modem photocopying
technology creates a pressing need for the law 'to strike an
the risk of restraining the free flow of information is more significant with
informational work, the scope of permissible fair use is greater." Id.
"' Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 553
(1985). Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[the applicability of the fair use
doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since, although the work is
unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the copyright
owner." Id.
98 Id. at 554 (stating that the unpublished nature of a work is a key, though
not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use).
99 Id. at 569 (finding that there is no warrant for judicially imposing, a
'compulsory license' permitting unfettered access to the unpublished
copyrighted expression of public figures).
100 471 U.S. 539
101 4 MELVILLE

(1985).
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §

13.05[AI[2][al (1997).

02 New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977).
'03
Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
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appropriate balance between the authors' interest in preserving the
integrity of copyright, and the public's right to enjoy the benefits
that photocopying technology offers.""0 "
In Texaco, Texaco employed 400 to 500 researchers who
conducted scientific research to develop new products and
technology primarily to improve commercial performance in the
petroleum industry.'t s In support of research activities, Texaco
"subscribe[d] to many scientific and technical journals and
maintain[ed] a sizable library with these materials1c6 Texaco
had
its library circulate current issues of relevant journals to their
researchers in order to keep them abreast of developments in their
fields.1 7 Researchers would review and photocopy relevant articles
intheir entirety and place the copies in files for later reference.'"
Based on these facts the Court held that "Texaco's photocopying of
[these] articles... was not fair use." "
(3) Substantiality of Use
The third factor, amount and substantiality, measures the length
of the quotation from a copyrighted work against the copyrighted
work as a whole." 0 The Second Circuit has stated that "[t]here are
no absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be
copied and still be considered fair use.""' In fact, it is clear that,
"whatever the use, generally it may not constitute a fair use if the

1'American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir.
1995) (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NmIMER & DAVID NMMER, NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT §13.05 [El[l] (1997)).

'0Id. at 915.
106Id.
10 7

id.

Id.
o9Id. at 931. The Second Circuit confined their ruling "to the institutional,
systematic, archival multiplication of copies ... for which licenses are in fact
available." Id.
110 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
108

"' Id.
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entire work is reproduced. ""2 But, even that is not absolute
because time-shifting of entire audiovisual work was permitted by
the Supreme Court in Sony." 3
Recent case law suggests that the substantiality issue is a question
of "qualitative substantiality" as well as of quantity. In Salinger v.
Random House, Inc.,"' where expropriated material formed a

sizable percentage of the body of work from which it was taken,
i.e., one-third of 17 letters and ten percent of 42 letters, the Second
Circuit seems to have been concerned largely with the question of
bulk in its determination that Ian Hamilton's use of material by J.D.
Salinger was infringement rather than fair use." 5 But in Harper &
Row v. Nation Enterprises,"6 a mere 300 words, however minor in
comparison to the size of the entire work from which removed,
7
were deemed to constitute the "heart" of a book-length work."
Consequently, the magazine's fair use defense was rejected."'
(4) Effect of Use on the Market
The Supreme Court has said that the issue of adverse "effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work" is the "single most important element of fair use."" 9 In
making this market analysis, courts have been concerned not only
with the effect on the original copyrighted work but also with the
likelihood that there will be interference with the market for

112 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.05[A][3] (1997).
113 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
114 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
"5 Id. at 98.
116 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
117 id.

.Id. at 569.
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); "Fair
use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied." Id. at 56667.
"1
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derivative works.'1° This could be a circular argument because a
market is irrelevant if there be "fair use."
The Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, has stated:
The choice of the term 'potential' seems appropriate ...

a

concept that has proved useful in the context of the
copyright fair use doctrine, which requires courts to weigh
as the most important factor in the fair use analysis 'the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
a copyrighted work.' . . . In determining which markets

are closely enough related to be considered 'potential,'
courts could examine the producer's business plans as well
as customary business practices ....The mere possibility
that a use could be licensed should not be sufficient, or the
term would become circular. -''
FIRST AMENDMENT

Many commentators and courts have recognized the potential
conflict between the first amendment right to freedom of speech,
and the right to copyright the expression of a work.' Most courts
have indicated that the fair use doctrine inherently accommodates
First Amendment concerns.'2 Since the fair use doctrine serves to
abolish copyright claims, courts have held that it eliminates the
concerns that are raised by free speech.' 24 In some cases it has been
stated that the fair use doctrine acts to preserve those interests of the

120 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985); New Era
Publications v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
12 Peters: Hearingson H.R. 2652 Before the House Subconun. in Courts and
Intellectual Property, 105'h Cong. 6 (1997); see generally 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A1[41 (1997).
1' Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
123id.

Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional
Limitations on the Protectionof Eirpression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979).
14
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First Amendment by allowing the access to expressions which are
otherwise protected by copyright law.125
Copyright law operates to preserve the property interests of a
copyright holder in order to preserve the economic incentive to
26
produce.'
The First Amendment reserves no such property
interest nor does it yield to economic encouragement. 1-7 If free
speech demands access to the expression of another's copyrighted
work, perhaps the First Amendment should not yield to copyright
28
law.
GOOD OR BAD FAITH
Because the fair use doctrine remains "an equitable rule of
reason," and presumes "good faith and fair dealing," the good or
bad faith of the parties may play a substantial role in a court's
determination of whether defendant's copying was fair and
12 9
reasonable.
On the other hand, Justice Souter in Campbell considered failure
to obtain a license irrelevant to a fair use analysis. 30 The company,
Acuff-Rose, held the copyright to a song entitled Oh Pretty Woman,
on which the band, "2 Live Crew" based their song, Pretty
Woman.'3' The band sent a letter and a copy of both the song and
the written lyrics to Acuff-Rose, asking for a license so that they
could produce their version of the song.'32 Although "2 Live
Crew" offered money to Acuff-Rose, they were denied permission
for usage. "2 Live Crew" produced their song Pretty Woman
despite the denial by Acuff-Rose to grant a license of the song Oh
Pretty Woman.'33 In litigation, Acuff-Rose asserted "2 Live
125 Id.

Id.
id.
128 id.
129 Iowa State University v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
126
127

ABC's conduct was not irrelevant to the fairness of the use).
130 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
131 id.
132Id.
33

1

Id.
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Crew's" intention to buy the copyright as evidence of the
infringer's state of mind. Justice Souter addressed this assertion by
writing:
Finally, regardless of the weight one might place on the
alleged infringer's state of mind, we reject Acuff-Rose's
argument that "2 Live Crew's" request for permission to
use the original should be weighed against a finding of fair
use. Even if good faith were central to fair use, "2 Live
Crew's" actions do not necessarily suggest that they
believed their version was not fair use; the offer may
simply have been made in a good faith effort to avoid this
litigation. If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission
need be sought or granted. Thus, being denied permission
to use a work does not weigh against the finding of fair
34
use.
And so, even as to bad or good faith, there is no unanimity.
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998
The question of copyright infringement in cyberspace and the
applicability of fair use doctrine on the Internet has recently been a
topic of much debate and concern in the world of copyright law.'
Indeed, "[a]s a two-way communication medium over which more
than one hundred million people send and receive communications,
the Internet differs fundamentally from traditional communication
media to which copyright law has applied." 34 However, with the
3
'3

Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).

See generally Monica P. McCabe et al., Internet Copyright Infringement:

Congress, Courts Address Liability of Third Parties, 220 N.Y.L.J. Si (1998);
See also Fred Koenigsberg, GuardingIntangible Propertyin a New, Intangible

Realm, 20 NAT'L L.J. C8 (1998); "The creation of a new 'place' in which
intellectual property is used - alternatively referred to as cyberspace, the
digital electronic environment, the global information infrastructure and the
Internet - presents a novel challenge to the continued protection of intellectual
property rights. The law must now deal creatively with that challenge." Id.
136 McCabe, supra note 135, at SI. See also Wendy Leibowitz, The Sound of
One Computer Copy, 21 NAT'L L.J. A16 (1998). "As computers, the world's
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passage and adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, "the landscape of Internet copyright is likely to change
significantly this year ....,
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,138 a bill recently
signed by President Clinton,'39 was "designed to facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the
digital age." 1' ° As evidenced by the Act's unanimous and speedy

passage, Congress has shown much concern for the impact that
copyright law and these amendments will have on electronic
commerce and technological development.' 1

greatest copying machines, proliferate, the operation of copyright law hits
home - or the office - as never before." Id. (emphasis added).

"' McCabe, supra note 135, at S1. See also Wendy Leibowitz, The Sound of
One Computer Copy, 21 NAT'L L.J. A16 (1998) (noting a paradigm shift in
copyright law in light of global technological changes).
138 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §
202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-83 (1998). The Senate Bill was unanimously
passed in May of 1998 and the House similarly passed its version on August 4,
1998; finally, President Clinton signed it on October 28, 1998.
1997
U.S.H.B. 2281.
139S.

REP. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998).

"4See id. The Committee Report describes the purpose and coverage of the
Act as follows:
Title I will implement the new World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, thereby bringing U.S.
copyright law squarely into the digital age and setting a
marker for other nations who must also implement these
treaties. Title II will provide certainty for copyright owners
and Internet service providers with respect to copyright
infringement liability online.
Title III will provide a
clarifying exemption in the Copyright Act to ensure that the
lawful owner or lessee of a computer machine may authorize
an independent service technician to activate the computer in
order to service its hardware components. Finally, Title IV
will begin to update our nation's copyright laws with respect
to library, archive, and educational uses of copyrighted
works in the digital age.
Id.
See id. § 205.
'4'
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act actually evolved from a
meeting in Geneva of the world's governments in December of
1996 to "hash out international treaties on copyright protection in
the age of the Internet.""" It signifies a first step in implementing
the World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter "WIPO"]
treaties (Title I of the new Act).' 3 In anticipation of signing the bill
into law, President Clinton stated: "This bill will extend intellectual
protection into the digital era while preserving fair use and limiting
infringement liability for providers of basic communication services
.... I urge the Senate to ratify these treaties so that America can
continue to lead the world in the Information Age."'"
This legislation was enacted specifically to bring into play the
strong copyright protections contemplated in Geneva at the WIPO
meeting. It makes the "minor modifications to U.S. copyright law
that are necessary to achieve compliance with the WIPO treaties." 5
Section 1201(a)(2) of Title I, Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems, prohibits, inter alia, manufacturing, importing,
offering for sale, providing or trafficking in products primarily
designed for the purpose of circumventing technological measures
Section
designed to control access to copyrighted works.
1201(a)(1), which prohibits the circumvention of copyrighted
works, begins only two years after the effective dates of the
legislation, that is, in late October of the year 2000 (Section
1201(a)(1)(A)). It shall not apply to any class of works identified
by the Register of Copyrights in consultation with the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information as
having had its users "adversely affected by virtue of such
Congress has ordered the Copyright Office to
prohibition."
undertake a rule-making in which it shall examine five separate
criteria to determine, essentially, whether the fair use of any
particular class (undefined) of copyrighted works has been unduly
limited by section 1201. The balance of section 1201 contains
,Matthew McAllester, Putting the Brakes on Highway Robbery, NEWSDAY,

October 28, 1998, at C3.
143id.

"I Id.
Fred Koenigsberg, Guarding Intangible Property in a New, Intangible
Realm, 20 NAT'L L.J. C8 (1998).
145
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numerous exceptions to the rules previously specified, including
exemptions for non-profit libraries, archives, and educational
institutions gaining access to the copyrighted work in order to make
a "good faith determination whether to acquire a copy of that work
for the sole purpose of engaging in the conduct permitted under this
title," that is, fair use.
As noted, Congress in the Digital Millennium Act itself did not
ignore "fair use." Further, in section 1201(c)(1), Congress stated
"Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, a
defense to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this
title" (emphasis supplied). And so, fair use is alive and well in the
Internet era!
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to make fair use decisions. Sadly, one must guess at
fair use probabilities. A lot depends on who your adversary is:
will he, she or it sue or not. Finally, even judges disagree as to
when fair use should apply, which explains why many fair use
cases are reversed on appeal. The author suggests a conservative
view when advising clients in this fast-changing area of the law.
In conclusion, the issue of whether fair use applies has been dealt
with in even the most controversial cases. No fair use was found
for the TV news broadcast of 30 seconds from a copyrighted
videotape of the Reginald Denny beating.Y 6 Despite the news
consideration in the use, and the fact that there could be no
substitute for use of the tape itself, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the unlicensed use was commercial, allowed "use[ of] the heart of
the tape," and impaired the copyright owner's original and primary
market." 7 This is but one illustration of how the application of the
fair use doctrine continues to develop, and an indication of the
challenges facing intellectual property law as we enter the new
millennium.

146Los

Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir.
1997).
47

1 1d. at 1123.
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